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Who May Start a County-Seat Removal? Bagot v. Antrim Supervisors (1880)

Published · 1 cited source

County: Antrim County

Scope

This entry rests on one source: the Michigan Supreme Court's reported decision in Bagot v. Board of Supervisors of Antrim County, 43 Mich. 577–584 [1]. It describes the legal dispute only as the opinion states it. The opinion does not give the date or result of any vote by the supervisors or the county's electors, or say when, or whether, county offices moved. The supervisors' proceedings and any election canvass were not examined.

The case

Richard W. Bagot, as relator, brought certiorari against the Board of Supervisors of Antrim County. The case was submitted April 30 and decided June 9, at the court's June Term of 1880 [1, pp. 577–578]. Justice Cooley wrote the opinion, and "the other Justices concurred" [1, pp. 578, 584].

Cooley stated the purpose of the application: "to determine the validity of the proceedings instituted and carried through by the supervisors of Antrim county for the removal of the county seat from Elk Rapids," where the Legislature had located it when the county was organized, "to a place recently platted as a village and named Belleair" [1, p. 578]. This entry keeps the opinion's spelling.

Charges the court set aside

The return brought up "an immense record." It covered the board's organizing of townships "for several years back," provision for county buildings, the issuing of evidences of debt, "and finally" the removal of the county seat [1, p. 578]. It was charged that townships had been organized prematurely to gain their supervisors' votes for removal, that there was corruption "in the first movements to select the new site," and that committees had been given unlawful powers [1, pp. 578–579].

These were allegations. The court said it "was conceded on the argument" that most of them had no bearing on the legal question. No one contended, the court said, that the validity of the board's action could depend on the motives behind it, and there was "no claim that there is evidence showing corruption in any act of the board of supervisors constituting an essential part of the proceedings" [1, p. 579]. The court made no finding on the charges. The only question it found worth discussing was "the power of the board to act at all" [1, p. 579].

The rule

The court quoted the state Constitution, article 10, section 8: "No county seat once established shall be removed until the place to which it is proposed to be removed shall be designated by two-thirds of the board of supervisors of the county, and a majority of the electors voting thereon shall have voted in favor of the proposed location ..." [1, p. 579]. The general statute followed the same pattern and had the board provide for the removal, together with all the records and papers, "within one year after such result shall be ascertained" [1, p. 580].

Bagot's argument

Bagot's side argued that the Constitution only limited removals, leaving the Legislature its power over the subject, and that where, "as in the case of Antrim county," the Legislature had established the permanent seat itself and had never submitted a removal proposal, no local body could begin one [1, pp. 580–581].

The court's answer

Cooley declined to read a lasting policy into differences between county organizing acts, which "temporary circumstances" shaped. Antrim, he wrote, "had one and only one active business place," so the Legislature named it, while in Leelanaw the choice was left to the electors [1, p. 582]. He expressly left open whether the Constitution would bar the Legislature from keeping the power to propose removals [1, p. 582]. He noted that people had supposed "ever since 1851" that supervisors held that authority, and that the question was raised "for the first time" after "twenty-nine years under the Constitution" [1, pp. 582–583]. Designating a site, he reasoned, itself proposes removal. "Not a word appears in the statute anywhere which indicates that legislative intervention was supposed to be necessary at any stage" [1, p. 583].

The headnote states the rule: a removal may originate with the supervisors, and a legislative "permanent location is only until a removal takes place in accordance with law" [1, p. 577]. The court ruled: "The writ of certiorari will be quashed, with costs" [1, p. 584].

Single source: this entry rests on one court opinion. It gives no vote count, election date, or account of whether or when county offices moved.

Sources

  1. Richard W. Bagot, relator v. Board of Supervisors of Antrim County, 43 Mich. 577 (Michigan Supreme Court, opinion of Cooley, J.; Michigan Reports, vol. 43, pp. 577–584, Henry A. Chaney, state reporter, Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1881; official scan hosted by the Michigan Courts, submitted April 30, decided June 9, 1880). Printed pp. 577–584 used (PDF pages 599–606 of the scan). Official scan (PDF) · Archive status not checked ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17

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